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Abstract
This paper reports findings of a laboratory experiment, which explores how self-
assessment regarding the own relative performance is perceived by others. In par-
ticular, I investigate whether overconfident subjects or underconfident subjects are
considered as more likable by others, and who of the two is expected to achieve a
higher performance in a real effort task. I observe that underconfidence beats over-
confidence in both respects. Underconfident subjects are rewarded significantly
more often than overconfident subjects, and are significantly more often expected
to win the competitive real-effort task. It seems as if subjects being less convinced
of their performance are taken as more congenial and are expected to be more am-
bitious to improve, whereas overconfident subjects are rather expected to rest on
their high beliefs. While subjects do not anticipate the stronger performance signal
of underconfidence, they anticipate its higher sympathy value. The comparison to a
non-strategic setting shows that men strategically deflate their self-assessment to be
rewarded by others. Women, in contrast, either do not deflate their self-assessment
or do so even in non-strategic situations, a behavior that might be driven by non-
monetary image concerns of women.
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1 Introduction
Earlier, mainly psychological and social psychological studies claim that people are over-
confident. However, recent economic studies show that individuals’ self-assessment is
rather precise or underconfident.1 As a biased self-assessment can lead to systematic
biases in individuals’ decision making the topic is of high interest to economists.2 Yet,
barely any research has been done to analyze how overconfidence in comparison to un-
derconfidence is perceived by others, and whether individuals adapt their self-assessment
to others’ perception.
I use a controlled laboratory study to address this topic, thereby focusing on two aspects:
First, I analyze whether underconfident individuals are perceived as more or less likable
than overconfident individuals. Secondly, I explore whether under- or overconfidence
is perceived as a stronger signal for ambition and effort. These findings contribute to
the expanding literature analyzing which advantages or disadvantages overconfidence in
comparison to underconfidence involves. Thereby, adding to the questions why individ-
uals might (rationally) exhibit a bias in their self-assessment and in which situations we
should expect individuals to over- or underestimate themselves. The perception of one’s
self-assessment is difficult to analyze in the field as self-confidence interacts with other
characteristics in many ways. The anonymous laboratory setting allows me to separate
the causal effects of over- and underconfidence on others’ appraisal, by only varying the
accuracy of subjects’ self-assessment.
The experiment consists of two parts. In part 1 all subjects perform an incentivized real
effort task which serves as the basis for their self-assessment. In part 2 two thirds of the
subjects (agents) are assigned a rank based on their relative performance, whereas each
rank is assigned to two subjects. The two agents having the same rank are assigned to one
of the remaining participants (principals). Both agents estimate their relative rank and
the principal learns by how many ranks each of them over- or underestimated himself.3
In treatment SYMP the principal chooses to whom of the two agents he wants to give 5
Euros. In treatment PERF the principal has a monetary incentive to choose the agent
1First psychological and social psychological evidence for overconfidence has sometimes been labelled
better-than-average effect (Alicke, 1985; Dunning et al., 1989; Messick et al., 1985; Svenson,1981). In
laboratory experiments Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005) show that choice behavior changes from overconfi-
dence to underconfidence when the task changes from easy and familiar to non-familiar. Krueger (1999)
and Moore and Cain (2007) also find that people tend to be underconfident rather than overconfident
when the task is (perceived as) difficult. Clark and Friesen (2009) test for overconfidence in people’s fore-
casts of their absolute and relative performance and observe a correct self-assessment or underconfidence
more often than overconfidence.
2For example Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) show that overconfidence makes bad performing men
selecting competitive payment schemes too often (regarding payoff maximization), and that underconfi-
dence makes high performing women selecting competitive payment schemes too little.
3The type of overconfidence observed in this study is overplacement as termed by Larrick et al. (2007).
See also Moore and Healy (2008) for a more precise distinction of the different types of overconfidence.
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who performs better in a repetition of the real effort task. The only information the
principal gets is the deviation of the agents’ self-assessments and the information that
both agents have the same actual rank. This element of the design is essential as subjects
on higher ranks are more likely to be underconfident, while subjects on lower ranks are
more likely to be overconfident, due to the limited scale for self-assessment. If subjects’
actual ranks differed, principals might choose the underconfident agent not because they
prefer underconfidence, but because underconfidence might signal a higher actual rank.
The results show that it can be advantageous to be underconfident with respect to the
perception of others. In SYMP principals reward the underconfident agent significantly
more often than the overconfident agent. In PERF principals bet on the underconfident
agent significantly more often than on the overconfident agent. Questionnaire data reveals
that underconfidence is preferred over overconfidence, and that the less self-confident
agent is expected to exert more effort to improve himself, while the more self-confident
agent is expected to rest on his high self-perception.
I also analyze whether the antipathy towards overconfidence is anticipated by eliciting the
agents’ (incentivized) beliefs of the principals’ selection choices. Moreover, to test whether
agents strategically bias their self-assessment in order to increase their selection chances,
I conduct two control treatments without monetary incentives to be selected by the
principal. Agents’ beliefs in PERF show that they do not expect underconfidence to signal
a higher performance than overconfidence. Correspondingly, there is no difference in self-
assessment between PERF and its control treatment. In contrast, subjects anticipate that
underconfidence is rewarded significantly more often than overconfidence, and men state
marginally significantly lower ranks in SYMP than in the non-strategic control treatment.
Yet, there is no difference in self-assessment for women. One explanation could be that
women do not downgrade their self-assessment strategically. Yet, I rather suggest that
they even lower their self-assessment in the non-strategic setting, as its accuracy is still
observable. Thus, they might still be afraid that their image might suffer when being
overconfident.4 Furthermore, women and men might downgrade their self-assessment in
non-strategic settings due to an idea which goes back to Myerson (1991). He suggests
that people internalize optimal behavior from certain situations and behave the same
way in similar but different situations.5 Thus, it might be the case that people have
somehow imprinted the social norm of modesty and even downgrade their self-assessment
in environments in which the (monetary) need for modesty is absent.6
4This is in line with women’s shame of overestimation observed by the experimental study by Ludwig
and Thoma (2012).
5Note that the accuracy of agents’ self-assessment is still observable in the control treatments, but
the agents do not have a monetary incentive to be chosen.
6Also compare Charness et al. (2012) who use this argumentation to explain overconfidence in non-
strategic competitive settings.
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There is an extensive and expanding literature on overconfidence. While one strand of this
literature analyzes whether people are overconfident (e.g. Clark and Friesen, 2009; Hoelzl
and Rustichini, 2005; Svenson, 1981), thereby focusing on the definition of overconfidence,
the appropriate measurement, and influencing factors ( see e.g. Benoˆıt and Dubra, 2011;
Moore and Healy, 2008), this paper is rather related to the strand of the overconfidence
literature identifying potential consequences of a biased self-assessment. Thereof, many
papers focus on non-payoff maximizing decisions caused by a biased self-assessment, e.g.
overinvestment, value-destroying mergers of CEOs (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999; Mal-
mendier and Tate, 2005 and 2008; Odean, 1999), and suboptimal selection of payment
schemes (Dohmen and Falk, 2011; Niederle et al., 2013; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007),
or work environments (Niederle and Yestrumkas, 2008). Another strand of the litera-
ture, mainly theoretical work, identifies utility enhancing aspects of being overconfident,
providing (behavioral) explanations for overconfidence at the same time. Overconfidence
may directly enhance well-being (Akerlof and Dickens, 1982; Brunnermeier and Parker,
2005; Caplin and Leahy, 2001; Koszegi, 2006), boost one’s motivation and willpower
(Be´nabou and Tirole, 2002; Brocas and Carrillo, 2000), or increase performance (Compte
and Postlewaite, 2004).
Only very few recent papers consider the impact of one’s self-assessment on others, and
whether individuals account for others’ perception when stating their self-assessment.
Ewers and Zimmermann (2012) theoretically and experimentally analyze whether indi-
viduals bias their self-assessment due to image concerns. They find that individuals state
a higher self-assessment if reports are observed by an audience (anonymity is lifted) than
in private.7 Yet, they find that self-assessments do not differ if true performance is also
publicly revealed, thus subjects do neither try to signal high ability nor modesty if the ac-
curacy of one’s self-assessment is observable. However, in contrast to my study, in Ewers
and Zimmermann (2012) individuals have no monetary incentives for strategically biasing
their self-assessment. Moreover, their study does not analyze how one’s self-assessment
is perceived by others, i.e. if one’s social image or expected ability is actually increased
by stating a higher self-assessment.
These issues are addressed in an experimental study by Charness et al. (2012). They in-
vestigate whether individuals bias their stated confidence about their performance strate-
gically to deter or motivate others to enter a two-player tournament, and whether others
react to it. They find that males inflate their stated confidence when deterrence is strate-
gically optimal, and that men and women deflate their confidence if encouraging entry
is strategically optimal. Moreover, they observe that individuals are less likely to enter
7Another study claiming that individuals inflate their self-assessment due to non-monetary image
concerns is Burks et al. (2013). In a large survey with male truck drivers, they find a correlation
between self-reports about how much one cares about one’s image and overconfidence, consequently
claiming that “overconfidence is social signaling bias”.
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the competition, the higher the confidence of the other person is. In line with these
results Reuben et al. (2012) observe that men inflate their self-assessment to be voted
as the group leader, which turns out to be a successful strategy.8 However, in both
studies individuals’ actual performance is unknown and might strongly differ. Expecting
all individuals to exhibit the same bias in self-assessment, the ranking of subjects’ self-
assessment most likely corresponds to the ranking of subjects’ true performance. Thus,
it is not the bias in self-assessment, which reveals information about the actual perfor-
mance, but the self-assessment per se. This is different in my experiment, in which both
agents have the same actual (relative) performance, enabling me to investigate whether
the bias in self-assessment serves as a performance signal or influences one’s image. In
many real-life situations, in which individuals have to assess their performance, e.g. in
promotion interviews or wage negotiations, the true performance is somehow appraised or
at least partly known. Thus, the accuracy of the self-assessment might also be evaluated.
On the one hand it might influence whether an individual is liked or not, on the other
hand it might serve as a performance signal.
To the best of my knowledge this study is the first, which experimentally tests whether
a principal prefers an over- or an underconfident agent. Yet, theoretical studies exist,
providing different predictions. Gervais and Goldstein (2007) suggest that skill and ef-
fort are complements, thus an overconfident agent makes a higher effort choice due to
underestimating the cost of effort or overestimating his marginal productivity. Sautmann
(2013) suggests that overconfident agents overestimate their expected payoff, thus receiv-
ing higher incentives with the same wage. In contrast, Santos-Pinto (2008) suggests that
a positive self-image and effort are substitutes, as an overconfident agent thinks that he
has to exert less effort for the same outcome than an underconfident agent.
This paper might also contribute to the literature observing gender differences in self-
assessment.9 I suggest that the observed antipathy towards overconfidence adds to the
explanation of the gender difference in self-assessment as women seem to experience
emotions, i.e. the negative attitude towards overconfidence, stronger than men (see e.g.
Brody, 1997; Grossman and Wood, 1993). In addition, they might even be punished more
harshly than men when being self-confident (Eagly, 1987; Rudman, 1998). My results
could moreover provide an explanation for the findings of Ludwig and Thoma (2012) who
observes that women have shame to overestimate themselves in public, while men have
8In an experimental study Montinari et al. (2012) observe that the ex ante low ability type is chosen
more often, as he is expected to exert more effort when receiving a fixed wage. However, the reason is
a higher expected reciprocity when hiring the low ability type, which is absent in my study, as agents
do not receive a fixed wage and do not learn whether they’ve been chosen or not until the end of the
experiment.
9See e.g. Balafoutas et al., 2012; Beyer, 1990; Beyer and Bowden, 1997; Charness et al., 2012; Datta
Gupta et al., 2013; Dohmen and Falk, 2011; Mo¨bius et al., 2012; Niederle et al., 2013; Niederle and
Vesterlund, 2007.
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not.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section, I describe the ex-
perimental design and the two different treatments. In Section 3 I present the main
experimental results, i.e. the selection behavior of the principals. In Section 4 I analyze
whether agents anticipate principals’ preferences and whether they strategically bias their
self-assessment. I conclude in Section 5.
2 Experimental Design
The experiment consists of two parts and a questionnaire, with separate instructions for
each part. In part 1 all participants conduct a real effort task (task 1), which is solving
Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM), a measure of cognitive ability (Raven,
2000). For each matrix participants have to select one out of 8 symbols fitting the visual
pattern of the matrix. An example of a matrix is given in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Example of a Raven Advanced Progressive Matrix
In this task ability and effort are needed to succeed in the task. The participants have
five minutes to solve as many matrices as possible. After choosing a symbol, they receive
feedback whether or not their chosen symbol is correct, and thereafter, the next matrix
appears. Once having chosen a symbol, they cannot go back and correct it, neither is it
possible to skip a matrix without making a choice. On subjects’ screens the remaining
time as well as the number of correctly and wrongly solved matrices is displayed. The
maximum number of matrices is 22, none of the subjects managed to get to the last
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matrix. Subjects are informed about their absolute performance, but neither about their
relative performance nor the performance of others. They receive 5 tokens for each matrix
they solve correctly. For each wrong answer 5 tokens are deducted from their earnings.
Yet, they receive at least 0 tokens for part 1. During the whole experiment participants
earn tokens, which are converted into Euros at the end of the experiment, at an exchange
rate of 1 Euro for 10 tokens. Before the five minutes start, participants solve two matrices
as a trial without payment. After the five minutes part 1 is finished and the instructions
for part 2 are distributed. The instructions for both parts are read aloud.
At the beginning of part 2 subjects are randomly assigned a role. Out of the 24 partici-
pants in each session, the role A is assigned to 8 participants (principals) and the role B
is assigned to 16 participants (agents). According to their performance in task 1, all 16
agents are ranked from 1-8, whereas each rank is assigned to two agents. The best and
second best agent receive rank 1, the third and fourth best receive rank 2 and so on. The
worst and second worst agent receive rank 8.10 The two agents having the same rank, are
merged to a pair, i.e. there are 8 pairs in each session. Each pair is randomly assigned
to one of the 8 principals.
I conduct two treatments. In each treatment both agents estimate their rank between
1 and 8 and the principal selects one of the two agents. The only information the prin-
cipal receives when making his choice, is the deviation of the agents’ self-assessment,
i.e. whether an agent under- or overestimated himself and to what extent. What differs
between the two treatments is the incentive of the principal whom to pick.
Agents receive 20 tokens if their estimated rank corresponds with their actual rank. The
payment for the accuracy of the guessed rank was not announced in the instructions,
but only on the screen of the agents. Hereby, I exclude that inequity aversion affects the
choice of the principals.11
As the scale for subjects’ relative self-assessment is limited, it naturally occurs that
subjects on a higher rank are more likely to underestimate their rank and subjects on
a lower rank are more likely to overestimate their rank. If the actual ranks of the two
agents differed, underconfidence might signal a higher actual rank than overconfidence.
Thus, the principal’s choice might be influenced by beliefs about the agents’ actual ranks,
mitigating the attitude towards over- or underconfidence. I exclude this effect by merging
two subjects on the same rank. Thus, the sign and the magnitude of their deviation does
not reveal a difference in their relative performance as there is none. The deviations of
agents’ self-assessments might only hint on a difference in the absolute performance, the
agents’ expected performance or self-confidence, which is what I am interested in.
10Two agents receive the same rank to have the same initial position for their self-assessment.
11Answers in the follow-up questionnaire show that principals nevertheless expected the agents to state
their true belief about their relative ranks.
7
Treatment Sympathy (SYMP):
In this treatment each principal selects one of his two agents, who then receives 50
tokens. To exclude fairness concerns of the principal, it is neither possible to split the
50 tokens nor to avoid the decision. The only information the principal receives about
the two agents is the deviation of their guessed ranks from their actual rank. Based on
this information, he chooses whom to give the 50 tokens. Yet, I use the strategy vector
method (SVM): Before the principal learns the actual deviations of the agents’ guessed
ranks, he takes the decision for 12 potential cases. Each case combines two different
deviations of the agents’ estimated ranks, including the sign of the deviation, i.e. if an
agent over- or underestimates himself. For example case 1a is the following:
• one person overestimates his rank by 1 rank
• one person underestimates his rank by 1 rank
If one agent over- and the other agent underestimates himself each by 1 rank, the decision
the principal takes for this case becomes relevant. The principal takes the decision for
12 different cases, which are listed in Table 1, where a negative deviation means that the
agent underestimates himself and a positive deviation means that the agent overestimates
himself. As accuracy might matter for the principal’s choices, using the SVM decreases
the number of sessions needed and allows for a cleaner data analysis, as each principal
takes the decisions for the same cases. I picked these 12 cases in order to include the
most realistic outcomes and to check the robustness of principals’ preferences.12
Table 1: The Cases for which Principals Take a Decision
Case 1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b 4a 4b 5a 5b 6a 6b
Deviation agent 1 1 2 2 -2 3 -3 1 -1 2 -2 2 -2
Deviation agent 2 -1 -2 -1 1 -1 1 0 0 0 0 1 -1
The deviation is calculated as “actual rank - guessed rank”, i.e. a positive deviation corresponds to
overconfidence, a negative deviation to underconfidence. If the absolute deviations of the two agents
differ (cases 2a-6b), the agent with the larger absolute deviation is listed on top.
In cases 1a and 1b both agents have the same absolute deviation. In cases 2a - 6b
agents’ accuracies differ and the less accurate agent is listed on top. In the a-cases the
more self-confident agent has a larger absolute deviation, in the b-cases he has a smaller
absolute deviation. For every case the principal selects one of the two agents, i.e. the one
who he wants to receive the 50 tokens. His choice becomes relevant for the case, which
actually applies to the two agents assigned to him. If none of the cases 1-12 applies to
the two agents, principals take a 13th decision: Principals choose whether the agent who
estimates the higher (better) rank or the agent who estimates the lower (worse) rank
12On subjects’ screens cases were listed in a different order and I varied whether the more or less
self-confident agent was listed first, what actually did not lead to different results.
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shall receive the 50 tokens. The accuracy of the agents’ estimated ranks is not considered
in this decision.13 If the two agents estimate the same rank, and therefore have the same
deviation, a case not covered by the decisions of the principal, chance determines which
agent receives the 50 tokens.14
After the 13 decisions, the principal learns the actual deviations of the two agents and
thus which case becomes relevant. He neither learns the actual nor the estimated ranks
of the agents. The agents learn their actual rank at the end of the experiment, but do
not learn the guessed rank of the other agent. They are informed about whether the
principal selected them or not, or whether the selection happened by chance.
Every principal receives 50 tokens for part 2 independent of his decision.
Treatment Performance (PERF ):
In PERF the principal takes the same 13 decisions as in SYMP, i.e. using the strategy
vector method, the principal chooses one out of two agents, based on the deviations of
their self-assessments. However, the motivation for the choice of the principal is different.
While in SYMP the principal’s choice does not influence his monetary payoff, in PERF
it does. To maximize his expected earnings, the principal should choose the agent with
the higher expected performance in a repetition of task 1, which is called task 2.
After the principals’ decisions, all agents perform the same task as in part 1, with dif-
ferent matrices. Every agent solves the matrices for himself, but the payment scheme is
competitive, with the two agents competing against each other. The agent, who achieves
the higher difference of correctly minus wrongly solved matrices, receives 50 tokens. In
case of a tie, the agent having solved more matrices correctly, receives the 50 tokens. If
this number is also equal, chance decides.
The principals do not participate in task 2. They bet on the agent chosen in cases 1-13.
If the agent, who the principal bets on, wins the competition, the principal receives 50
tokens. If both agents estimate the same rank, chance determines on whom the principal
bets. After his decisions the principal learns about the actual deviations of both agents
and which case is relevant. As in SYMP, the principal does neither learn the actual nor
the estimated ranks of the agents. An agent receives 50 tokens if the principal bets on
him. This monetary incentive is introduced to analyze whether agents bias their self-
assessment in order to be selected. The analysis is shown in section 4. The payment is
only announced on the agents’ screens, thus principals do not know that an agent receives
money when they bet on him, in order to avoid that feelings of sympathy and inequity
aversion influence principals’ choices. An agent learns whether the principal bet on him,
but only after task 2. This is common knowledge. An agent does not learn the estimated
13This case actually became relevant in 20 out of 56 cases.
14This case became relevant in 8 out of 56 cases.
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rank of the other agent, only when the two estimated the same rank, they learn that a
chance move decides on whom the principal bets.
In both treatments all subjects are asked additional incentivized questions. In particular
they estimate the mean deviation of agents and the choice behavior of principals. After
the announcement of the payoffs, subjects complete a questionnaire asking for their age,
gender, subject of study, choice motivation, and a self-assessment of risk preferences
(Dohmen et al., 2011). Figure 2 illustrates the course of the treatment PERF. SYMP
has the same course except that there is no task 2.
Figure 2: The Timeline of PERF
All:  
Task 1  
Agents estimate 
their rank 
Principals select 
agent via SVM 
Information principals:  
Actual deviations of 
agents and whom they 
selected 
Assignment of roles 
Ranking of agents 
Allocation of agent 
pairs to principal 
Elicitation  
of beliefs 
Information agents:  
own rank, own payoff, 
whether selected or not 
Information principals: 
own payoff 
Agents:  
Task 2  
Experimental Procedure
I conducted the computerized experiment in the Munich Experimental Laboratory for
Economic and Social Sciences (MELESSA) at the University of Munich during spring
2012. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-tree (Fis-
chbacher, 2007) and participants were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). In total
216 subjects participated in the experiment (mainly students from the universities in
Munich). I ran 5 sessions of SYMP and 4 sessions of PERF, whereof in each treatment
2 sessions were control sessions for agents, on which I will comment in Section 4.
Subjects were randomly assigned to sessions and could take part in one session only.
Each session had 24 subjects and lasted a little less than one hour. Subjects earned 12.15
Euros on average (including a show-up fee of 4 Euros).
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3 Experimental Results
3.1 Treatment SYMP
Table 2 reports the shares of principals choosing either the one or the other agent in
each of the 13 different cases in SYMP. There are 40 principals in total. In 2 sessions
(16 principals), which were control treatments for the agents, the principals’ choices were
only hypothetical and had no consequence on the decision, which agent received the 50
tokens. This decision was taken by chance to analyze whether agents’ self-assessment is
influenced by the principals’ choices. The analysis is provided in the next section. The
principals’ decisions in these 2 sessions are not significantly different from the principals’
choices in the other 3 sessions with actual choices, thus I pool the data.15
Table 2: Principals’ Selection Behavior in SYMP.
Case 1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b
Deviation of agent 1 1 2 2 -2 3 -3
Deviation of agent 2 -1 -2 -1 1 -1 1
Share selecting agent 1 35% 12.5% 5% 32.5% 2.5% 27.5%
Share selecting agent 2 65% 87.5% 95% 67.5% 97.5% 72.5%
Binomial test (p-value) 0.040 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.003
McNemar test (p-value) 0.004 0.007 0.002
Case 4a 4b 5a 5b 6a 6b 7
Deviation of agent 1 1 -1 2 -2 2 -2 high
Deviation of agent 2 0 0 0 0 1 -1 low
Share selecting agent 1 10% 5% 2.5% 7.5% 10% 10% 32.5%
Share selecting agent 2 90% 95% 97.5% 92.5% 90% 90% 67.5%
Binomial test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.019
McNemar test (p-value) 0.688 0.500 1.000
Every principal took every decision 1a-7. # of observations is 40 (including 16 hypothetical choices). A
positive deviation represents “overconfidence”, whereas a negative deviation represents
“underconfidence”. The Binomial test tests for a difference between selection rates and a 50:50 split for
each case. The McNemar test tests for a difference between cases a and b.
The first important observation is that principals favor agents who are underconfident
rather than overconfident. In case 1a 65% of principals (26 out of 40) reward the agent
who underestimates his rank by 1 rank, whereas only 35% of principals (14 out of 40)
reward the agent who overestimates his rank by 1 rank. This distribution is significantly
different from a 50:50 split (one-sided binomial test, p=0.040). The result is even stronger
in case 1b, in which 87.5% of principals (35 out of 40) reward the agent who underesti-
15Results go in the same direction when excluding the principals with hypothetical choices, but are
less significant due to fewer observations. The separated data is listed in the appendix.
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mates his rank by 2 ranks and only 12.5% of principals (5 out of 40) reward the agent
who overestimates his rank by 2 ranks (one-sided binomial test, p=0.000). In case 7 in
which the absolute deviation is unknown, 67.5% of principals reward the agent estimating
the lower rank (low guess) and only 32.5% reward the agent estimating the higher rank
(high guess) (one-sided binomialtest, p=0.019). These results are illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Principals’ Choices for Cases 1a, 1b, and 7 in SYMP
0%	  
10%	  
20%	  
30%	  
40%	  
50%	  
60%	  
70%	  
80%	  
90%	  
100%	  
|Devia3on|=1	   |Devia3on|=2	   Devia3on	  unknown	  
Overconfident	  agent/high_guess	   Underconfident	  agent/low_guess	  
If agents’ deviations differ (cases 2a-6b), the agent with the smaller absolute deviation
is selected significantly more often - in every case - as shown by the results in Table
2. Figure 4 illustrates principals’ choice behavior, whereas for each case the right bar
represents the share of principals selecting the more accurate agent.
Despite the preference for accuracy, I observe that underconfidence is preferred over over-
confidence. In 2a (3a) only 5% (2.5%) of principals choose the less accurate, overconfident
agent, whereas in 2b (3b) 32.5% (27.5%) choose the less accurate, underconfident agent.
The differences between cases 2a vs. 2b and 3a vs. 3b are significant (McNemar p=0.007
and p=0.002). Note that I do not observe a difference in selection behavior between
cases 4a vs. 4b and 5a vs. 5b, meaning that the less accurate underconfident agent is not
significantly more often selected than the less accurate overconfident agent if the more
accurate agent is estimating his rank correctly (instead of being over- or underconfident).
Thus, the higher selection rate of the less accurate agent in cases 2b and 3b, in compari-
son to 2a and 3b, seem to be driven by an antipathy towards overconfidence and not by
a preference for underconfidence over accuracy.
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Figure 4: Principals’ Choices for Cases 2 - 6 in SYMP
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10%	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  agent	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These results are confirmed by probit regressions, which are reported in Table 3.16 The de-
pendent variable is 1 if the agent with the larger absolute deviation is selected. inacc low
is a dummy for the cases, in which the agent with the larger absolute deviation (the more
inaccurate agent) is underconfident, thus stating the lower rank (cases 2b, 3b, 4b, 5b,
and 6b). Column (1) includes the principals’ choices for the cases 2 and 3, i.e. all cases
in which agents have a different absolute deviation and one agent is under- and the other
agent is overconfident. Column (2) includes principals’ choices for the cases 4-6, i.e. the
cases in which either one agent has a deviation of 0 (cases 4-5), or both agents are either
under- or overconfident (cases 6a and 6b). In both regressions I include control variables
for risk and gender and cluster on principals.17
The coefficient of inacc low in column (1) is highly significant, while in column (2) it is
not. This shows that the less accurate agent is more likely to be selected if he is under-
and the other agent is overconfident.
Considering the main focus of this study, i.e. the different perception of over- and under-
confidence, the main result of SYMP is the following:
16The results are robust to OLS regressions.
17To elicit risk preferences, individuals indicated on a scale ranging from 0 to 10 whether they are
willing to take risks (or try to avoid risks). 0 represented a very weak willingness to take risks, while 10
represented a strong willingness to take risks. Dohmen et al. (2011) show that this general risk question
is a good predictor of actual risk-taking behavior.
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Table 3: Probit of Selection of the Less Accurate Agent in SYMP
(1) (2)
Cases 2-3 Cases 4-6
Coefficient Coefficient
(p-value) (p-value)
inacc low 1.233 0.003
(0.000) (0.990)
Female 0.015 -0.235
(0.960) (0.508)
Risk -0.110 -0.044
(0.121) (0.509)
I cluster standard errors on principals. Number of observations is 160 (1) and 240 in (2). In cases 2-3
one agent is overconfident, the other agent is underconfident. In cases 4-5 one agent has a deviation of
0, the other agent is under or overconfident; in cases 6 both agents’ deviations have the same sign.
Result 1 If controlling for accuracy, in treatment SYMP agents who are underconfident
are rewarded significantly more often than agents who are overconfident.
A modest agent who underestimates his performance is more likely to be rewarded by
the principal than an overconfident agent, who believes that his performance has been
better than it actually was. In the questionnaire answered by subjects at the end of
the experiment, a reasoning for this behavior is revealed: most subjects prefer modest
persons to self-confident persons. Some subjects even stated explicitly that they dislike
people who are overconfident.
3.2 Treatment PERF
The principals’ choice behavior for all 13 decisions in PERF is reported in Table 4.
I observe that the underconfident agent is selected more often than the overconfident agent
when the agents’ absolute deviations are equal or unknown. In case 1a 62.5% of principals
(20 out of 32) bet on the agent who underestimates himself by 1 rank, while only 37.5%
(12 out of 32) bet on the agent who overestimates himself by 1 rank. This result is not
significant, but close to marginally significant (one-sided binomial-test, p = 0.108). Yet,
in case 1b 75% of principals (24 out of 32) bet on the agent underestimating himself by 2
ranks, while only 25% (8 out of 32) bet on the agent overestimating himself by 2 ranks.
This is significantly different from a 50:50 split (one-sided binomial-test, p = 0.004).
In case 7 62.5% select the agent estimating the lower rank and 37.5% select the agent
estimating the higher rank (p = 0.108). The selection rates for cases 1a, 1b, and 7 are
illustrated in Figure 5.
The principals’ choice rates in PERF for the cases 2-6 are illustrated in Figure 6. Almost
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Table 4: Principals’ Selection Behavior in PERF
Case 1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b
Deviation agent 1 1 2 2 -2 3 -3
Deviation agent 2 -1 -2 -1 1 -1 1
Share selecting agent 1 37.5% 25% 12.5% 53.1% 15.6% 46.9%
Share selecting agent 2 62.5% 75% 87.5% 46.9% 84.4% 53.1%
Binomial test (p-value) 0.108 0.004 0.000 0.430 0.000 0.430
McNemar test (p-value) 0.424 0.004 0.002
Case 4a 4b 5a 5b 6a 6b 7
Deviation agent 1 1 -1 2 -2 2 -2 high
Deviation agent 2 0 0 0 0 1 -1 low
Share selecting agent 1 28.1% 53.1% 15.6% 40.6% 21.9% 46.9% 37.5%
Share selecting agent 2 71.9% 46.9% 84.4% 59.4% 78.1% 53.1% 62.5%
Binomial test (p-value) 0.010 0.430 0.000 0.189 0.001 0.430 0.108
McNemar test (p-value) 0.057 0.057 0.021
Every principal took all 13 decisions. # of observations is 32. A positive deviation represents
“overconfidence”, whereas a negative deviation represents “underconfidence”. The Binomial test tests
for a difference between selection rates and a 50:50 split for each case. The McNemar test tests for a
difference between cases a and b.
Figure 5: Principals’ Choices for Cases 1a, 1b, and 7 in PERF
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all principals select the agent stating the lower rank if he has the smaller absolute de-
viation (cases 2a, 3a, 4a, 5a, 6a). Yet, there is not a single case, in which the agent
stating the higher rank is selected significantly more often than the agent estimating
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Figure 6: Principals’ Choices for Cases 2 - 6 in PERF
0%	  
10%	  
20%	  
30%	  
40%	  
50%	  
60%	  
70%	  
80%	  
90%	  
100%	  
2a	   2b	   3a	   3b	   4a	   4b	   5a	   5b	   6a	   6b	  
less	  accurate	  agent	   more	  accurate	  agent	  
the lower rank, even if he has the smaller absolute deviation (cases 3b, 4b, 5b, 6b). In
these cases selection rates are not significantly different from a 50:50 split as confirmed
by binomial tests reported in Table 4. Note that even for cases 4b and 5b, in which one
agent correctly assesses himself and the other agent underestimates himself, roughly 50%
of principals select the underconfident agent. This shows that principals, betting on the
underconfident agent in cases 2b and 3b, do not only choose the underconfident agent to
avoid betting on the overconfident agent (as it happens in SYMP). Instead, they seem
to be convinced that the underconfident agent will perform better in task 2. This also
becomes apparent when conducting the same two probit regressions as in SYMP. The
results are reported in Table 5.18
As above, the dependent variable is 1 if a principal selects the less accurate agent. The
results in column (1) show that the less accurate agent is more likely to be selected if he
is underconfident and the more accurate agent is overconfident than if he is overconfident
and the more accurate agent is underconfident. However, in contrast to SYMP I observe
that the coefficient of inacc low in column (2) is also highly significant. This means that
even if the more accurate agent is assessing himself correctly (or the deviation of his
self-assessment goes in the same direction), the less accurate agent is more likely to be
selected if he is underconfident than if he is overconfident.
In addition, the within-data analysis of principals shows that roughly one third of the
18The results are robust to OLS regressions.
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Table 5: Probit of Selection of the Less Accurate Agent in PERF
(1) (2)
Cases 2-3 Cases 4-6
Coefficient Coefficient
(p-value) (p-value)
inacc low 1.080 0.700
(0.000) (0.001)
Female -0.093 0.150
(0.785) (0.633)
Risk 0.015 0.060
(0.827) (0.337)
I cluster standard errors on principals. Number of observations is 128 (1) and 192 in (2). In cases 2-3
one agent is overconfident, the other agent is underconfident. In cases 4-5 one agent has a deviation of
0, the other agent is under or overconfident; in cases 6 both agents’ deviations have the same sign.
inacc low is 1 for the b cases in which the agent stating the lower rank has a larger absolute deviation.
principals always selects the agent stating the lower rank, independent of the agents’
absolute deviations. Another third of principals always selects the more accurate agent.
Very few principals always select the agent stating the higher rank, and some principals
seem to select randomly. Thus, in the cases in which selection shares are equal, the selec-
tion does not occur randomly, but most principals have a preference either for accuracy
or a low self-assessment. This is also confirmed by answers given in the questionnaire.
Thus, the main result of PERF is the following.
Result 2 In PERF underconfidence seems to be perceived as a stronger signal for future
performance than overconfidence.
I observe that both agents are equally likely to win the competition independent of their
self-assessment. Yet, only very few principals seem to chose randomly, but rather seem to
have a clear preference. In the questionnaire, I asked the subjects to state reasons for their
choice. The answer given most often was that they expected the underconfident agent
trying harder to improve and thus exerting more effort in task 2 than the overconfident
agent. The few principals choosing the overconfident agent stated that they expected
self-confidence to enhance performance. The reason for selecting the accurate agent was
that an agent being able to estimate his performance correctly was expected to have a
high overall level of performance.
3.3 Treatment Comparison
Both treatments have the same main result: underconfidence is preferred over overcon-
fidence. A difference between the two treatments is that in PERF, in which principals
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select the agent who they expect to have a higher future performance, accuracy seems to
be less important. In PERF the agent having the larger absolute deviation is significantly
more often selected than in SYMP, especially if he stated the lower rank (one-sided test
of proportions, case 2b: p=0.039, 3b: p=0.045, 4b: 0.000, 5b: p=0.000, 6b: p=0.082).
Interestingly, this also holds true for the agent stating the higher rank (one-sided test
of proportions, case 2a: p=0.126, 3a: p=0.023, 4a: 0.010, 5a: p=0.000, 6a: p=0.082).
I conclude that in PERF more principals value a low self-assessment over an accurate
self-assessment, and some also value a high and confident self-assessment, which is not the
case in SYMP. Note that principals’ expectations about agents’ self-assessments do not
differ across treatments. Principals expect an average deviation of 0.4 in both treatments
(MWU, two-sided, p=0.891).19
These treatment differences are also confirmed by two probit regressions, which are re-
ported in Table 6.20 As in the earlier probit regressions, the dependent variable is 1 if
the principal selects the less accurate agent, and it is 0 if he selects the more accurate
agent. I conduct two separate regressions for the cases 2-3 and the cases 4-6. inacc low
is a dummy, being 1 for the cases, in which the less accurate agent is the agent stating
the lower rank, PERF is a treatment dummy, and PERF* inacc low the interaction of
the two, in order to check whether the treatment difference is even larger for the agent
stating the lower rank. In both regressions I cluster standard errors on principals.
Table 6: Probit of Selection of the Less Accurate Agent
Cases 2-3 Cases 4-6
Coefficient Coefficient
(p-value) (p-value)
inacc low 1.245 0.004
(0.000) (0.985)
PERF 0.718 0.657
(0.033) (0.025)
PERF*inacc low -0.160 0.694
(0.709) (0.026)
Female -0.085 0.011
(0.700) (0.867)
Risk -0.047 0.011
(0.330) (0.807)
Includes decisions of all principals, number of observations is 288 in column 1 and 432 in column 2, SE
are clustered on principals.
19This also indicates that principals do not expect agents to downgrade their self-assessment. Moreover,
principals were asked in the questionnaire if they think that agents stated the rank they actually think
they have. The answer given was ”yes“ with almost no exception although principals did not know that
agents’ guess was incentivized.
20The results are robust to OLS regressions.
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I observe that the coefficient of the treatment dummy PERF is significantly different
from zero and positive in both regressions. Thus, the probability to be selected when
being the less accurate agent is significantly higher in PERF than in SYMP. This result
does not only hold true for the agent stating the lower rank (inacc low), but also for the
agent stating the higher rank. However, for the cases 4-6 the probability when being the
less accurate agent and underconfident is even higher, as the coefficient of the interaction
term PERF*inacc low is positive and significant. Thus, the main treatment difference is
the following:
Result 3 In SYMP principals are more concerned about the accuracy of the agents’ self-
evaluation than in PERF. In PERF the less accurate agent is selected significantly more
often than in SYMP, especially if he is underconfident.
4 Further Analysis
The results in the former section show that it might have negative consequences when be-
ing overconfident. This might explain why individuals are modest in their self-assessment.
In this section I first analyze whether agents anticipate the preference for underconfidence,
and second, whether they (consciously) downgrade their self-assessment.
4.1 Anticipation of Principals’ Preferences
After the principals’ selection, agents estimated principals’ selection behavior for the cases
listed in Table 7. For each case they estimated how many of the 8 principals in their
session selected the agent with the deviation listed first. One question was randomly
chosen for payment and participants received 1 Euro if their answer did not differ more
than +/-0.5 from the correct answer. The agents’ average estimations are reported in
Table 7.
In SYMP agents anticipate a stronger sympathy towards underconfidence than towards
overconfidence. In PERF agents do not seem to expect the strong preference for under-
confident agents. Instead agents seem to believe that overconfidence signals high future
performance to principals, even though it does not. In other words, agents think that
principals select the overconfident agent significantly more often in PERF than in SYMP,
which is actually not true (case 1a and 2a). However, they do anticipate correctly that
the less accurate agent is selected significantly more often in PERF than in SYMP. There
are no gender differences in answers.
19
Table 7: Agents’ Average Estimation of Principals’ Choice Behavior
# obs. Case 1a Case 2a Case 2b Case 4a Case 4b
(+1, -1) (+2, -1) (-2, +1) (1, 0) (-1, 0)
SYMP 48 2.33 1.40 4.44 1.19 2.06
PERF 32 4.0 3.19 3.79 3.34 3.62
p-value (MWU) 0.000 0.000 0.038 0.000 0.002
Including all agents, excluding the control sessions, in which principals made hypothetical choices. The
numbers are the average estimation of the agents to the question, how many of the 8 principals chose
the agent with the deviation listed first. E.g. the average agent thinks that on average 2.33 principals
in SYMP picked the overconfident agent (deviation +1) in case 1a. The last row reports p-values of
MWU-tests of treatment differences.
4.2 Strategic Adaptation of Self-Assessment
As agents only seem to anticipate principals’ preference for underconfidence in SYMP,
but not in PERF, agents’ self-assessment should be lower in SYMP than in PERF. This
actually holds true as reported further below. Yet, other factors might also trigger a
difference in stated ranks, because the two settings are different. Therefore, I conduct
two control treatments.
In SYMP-CON, which is the control treatment for SYMP, the agent receiving the 50
tokens is not selected by the principal, but by chance. To keep as much equal to SYMP
as possible, each pair of agents is assigned to a principal and the principal learns the actual
deviations of the two agents. Thus, a treatment difference in self-assessment cannot be
caused by social image concerns or shame of overestimation (Ludwig and Thoma, 2012),
but only by the (absent) incentive to be selected by the principal. I ask the principals
to make the same (hypothetical) 13 decisions as in SYMP, but without any monetary
consequences for any participant. Agents do not know that the principals make these
hypothetical choices.
In PERF-CON, which is the control treatment for PERF, agents do not receive any tokens
if the principal bets on them, i.e. they do not have a monetary incentive to be selected
by the principal.21
To control for potential differences in performance across treatments, I calculate the
accuracy of agents’ stated ranks instead of only comparing agents’ self-assessment. As
agents’ ranks are determined endogenously within a session, agents’ actual ranks might be
influenced by performance differences across sessions. Therefore, I use an agent’s optimal
guessed rank instead of the actual rank to calculate his deviation. The optimal guessed
21Note that there is no difference between PERF and PERF-CON for principals as they are not
informed about agents monetary incentive in PERF. I pool PERF and PERF-CON in the section
analyzing principals’ behavior.
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rank is the rank that is most likely assigned to an agent, given his performance and the
performance distribution of all agents in all treatments.22 I calculate the deviation of
an agent as his optimal guessed rank minus his actual rank. Thus, a negative deviation
represents underconfidence, a positive deviation represents overconfidence. Table 8 gives
an overview of agents’ average guessed and optimal guessed ranks as well as their average
deviation in all treatments.
Table 8: Guessed and Optimal Guessed Ranks of Agents
# obs. Guessed Rank Optimal guessed Rank Deviation
SYMP 48 4.08 3.96 -0.13
SYMP-CON 32 4.22 4.47 0.25
PERF 32 4.47 5.28 0.81
PERF-CON 32 4.00 4.19 0.19
An agent’s deviation is calculated as optimal guessed rank - guessed rank.
While agents are slightly underconfident in SYMP (average deviation -0.13), they are
slightly overconfident in the other three treatments.23 The deviation across SYMP
and PERF is significantly different (MWU, two-sided, p=0.021). I cannot differentiate
whether agents state a higher rank in PERF or a lower rank in SYMP.24 Moreover, the
differences between treatments and control treatments are not significant (MWU, two-
sided, SYMP: p=0.562; PERF : p=0.236). As participants do not seem to anticipate the
preference for underconfidence in PERF the absence of a difference in deviations between
PERF and PERF-CON is not surprising. However, I expected a lower self-assessment in
SYMP than in SYMP-CON. A possible explanation for why this is not the case is that
in SYMP-CON as in SYMP, principals get to know whether an agent over- or underesti-
mated himself. Ludwig and Thoma (2012) show that women have shame to overestimate
themselves, while men have not. Women’s shame might bias their self-assessment in
the same direction as the ambition of being selected by the principal, leading to a low
self-assessment in both treatments. As men seem to be less prone to this kind of shame,
I conduct ordered probit regressions controlling for gender, in order to explore whether
gender differences in stated ranks exist.
22To calculate the optimal guessed ranks, I ran Monte-Carlo simulations, in which I randomly drew
500,000 groups consisting of 15 participants out of the performance distribution of all agents (with
replacement). I then calculated for any given performance level the rank within each simulated group.
The optimal guessed rank equals the mode of all 500,000 simulated ranks.
23I cannot confirm the highly debated finding that subjects are overconfident. In this experiment, the
subjects have a rather precise self-assessment. 22 % of agents estimate their rank correctly, 35 % have a
deviation of +/-1 rank, 25 % have a deviation of +/-2 ranks and only 9% of subjects overestimate their
rank by 3 or 4 ranks. In comparison also 9 % underestimate their rank by 3-5 ranks.
24Note that optimal guessed ranks in PERF are lower than in SYMP. As participants on lower ranks
are more likely to overestimate themselves, the difference across treatments might not be due to a
treatment difference, but only due to a performance difference and the limited scale. To take care of this
issue I conduct Ordered Probit regressions below.
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Table 9 reports the results of ordered probit regressions for each gender separately.25
The dependent variable is the guessed rank. The independent variables are the optimal
guessed rank (as performance measure), a dummy for CON, being one for PERF-CON
and SYMP-CON, a dummy for PERF, being one for PERF and PERF-CON, and an
interaction dummy for PERF-CON.26 I also control for risk aversion.
Table 9: Ordered Probit of Guessed Rank
(1) (2)
WOMEN MEN
Opt. guessed rank 0.288*** 0.418***
PERF -0.264 0.125
CON 0.055 -0.566*
PERF ∗CON 0.160 0.211
Risk 0.001 0.214
# of observations 78 66
The table reports the coefficients. Base case is SYMP.
The sample consists of all agents and the regression clusters on sessions.
*** significant on 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level
Column 1 reports the results for men, column 2 reports the results for women. I observe
that for men the coefficient of CON is marginal significant (p=0.072) and negative, i.e.
men rank themselves lower in SYMP than in CON. It seems as if men strategically lower
their self-assessment in SYMP to increase their selection chances.
There is no significant difference in self-assessment for women across SYMP and CON.
Note that there is no gender difference in self-assessment except in SYMP-CON, in which
men rank themselves higher than women (MWU, two-sided, p=0.032).
Besides a conscious downgrade of self-assessment, it can be the case that the social antipa-
thy towards overconfidence influences subjects’ self-assessment unconsciously. Subjects’
self-assessment might not only be influenced in situations, in which others learn their
self-assessment, but per se. Charness et al. (2012) show that individuals might act out
of unconscious strategic concerns, even in situations, in which strategic concerns are ab-
sent. They pick up the idea made by Myerson (1991) and further developed by Samuelson
(2001) that people make the same decisions in situations that appear to be similar for the
sake of convenience. This can lead to suboptimal behavior in certain situations. While
Charness et al. (2012) argue that subjects might be overconfident due to an internal-
25The results are robust when conducting OLS regressions.
26I do not use three dummies for three treatments, but one for PERF and one for CON, and an
interaction of the two for PERF-CON. Results are the same when including three dummies for PERF,
PERF-CON and SYMP-CON, except that the coefficient of PERF-CON is marginally significant for
men.
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ization of the positive impact of overconfidence, I suggest that the opposite can be the
case.
5 Conclusion
In this paper I analyze how overconfidence in comparison to underconfidence is perceived
by others. The results reveal that underconfident agents are perceived as more likable
than overconfident agents and are expected to exhibit a higher performance in a real
effort task. Questionnaire answers suggest that modest agents are expected to be more
ambitious to improve, while overconfident agents rather have the reputation to rest on
their high self-confidence.
Elicited beliefs of agents show that they do not expect the principals to select the un-
derconfident agent more often when performance is the critical selection criterion. How-
ever, they anticipate that underconfidence is deemed more likeable than overconfidence.
The comparison of stated self-assessments to a treatment, in which the principal can-
not make a selection choice (non-strategic setting) shows that men slightly deflate their
self-assessment strategically to be rewarded by the principal. Yet, women do not. An
explanation might be given by women’s shame of overestimation (Ludwig and Thoma,
2012) suggesting that women even deflate their self-assessment in the non-strategic set-
ting, as principals still learn the deviation of agents’ self-assessment. Thus, apart from
monetary consequences women might expect their social image to suffer. Moreover, be-
sides the conscious adaptation of self-assessment, individuals might have internalized the
negative attitude towards overconfidence and might be modest in situations, in which no
strategic concerns are at place.
While further research is needed to precisely identify in which situations individuals might
bias their self-assessment consciously or unconsciously, the results reported in this paper
provide an important fact one should consider when eliciting and interpreting individuals’
self-assessment: subjects might not state the self-assessment that they actually have, but
that has the largest signaling value.
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6 Appendix A2
A2.1 Tables
Table A2.1: Principals’ Choices in SYMP Separated
SYMP SYMP-CON
Case 1a
Deviation of agent 1 1 62.5% 68.8%
Deviation of agent 2 -1 37.5% 31.2%
Case 1b
Deviation of agent 1 2 91.7% 81.3%
Deviation of agent 2 -2 8.3% 18.7%
Case 2a
Deviation of agent 1 2 95.8% 93.8%
Deviation of agent 2 -1 4.2% 6.2%
Case 2b
Deviation of agent 1 -2 70.8% 62.5%
Deviation of agent 2 1 29.2% 37.5%
Case 3a
Deviation of agent 1 3 95.8% 100%
Deviation of agent 2 -1 4.2% 0%
Case 3b
Deviation of agent 1 -3 66.7% 81.2%
Deviation of agent 2 1 33.3% 18.8%
Case 4a
Deviation of agent 1 1 91.7% 87.5%
Deviation of agent 2 0 8.3% 12.5%
Case 4b
Deviation of agent 1 -1 95.8% 97.8%
Deviation of agent 2 0 4.2% 2.2%
Case 5a
Deviation of agent 1 2 95.8% 100%
Deviation of agent 2 0 4.2% 0%
Case 5b
Deviation of agent 1 -2 91.7% 93.8%
Deviation of agent 2 0 8.3% 6.2%
Case 6a
Deviation of agent 1 2 91.7% 87.5%
Deviation of agent 2 1 8.3% 12.5%
Case 6b
Deviation of agent 1 -2 91.7% 87.5%
Deviation of agent 2 -1 8.3% 12.5%
Case 7
higher guess 33.3% 31.2%
lower guess 66.7% 68.8%
Each principal took every decision 1a-7. # of observations is 24 in SYMP and 16 in SYMP-CON.
A positive deviation represents “overconfidence”, whereas a negative deviation represents
“underconfidence”. SYMP-CON is the control treatment of SYMP, in which principals make
hypothetical choices without any payoff consequences.
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A2.2 Instructions (translated from German)
We welcome you to this experiment. Please read these instructions carefully. After the
start of the experiment, please follow the instructions on your screen.
At the end of the experiment you will get paid according to your decisions and the
decisions of the other participants as described below. In addition, you will get a fixed
payment of 4 Euro for your attendance.
During the whole experiment you are not allowed to talk to other participants, to use
mobile phones, or to start other programs on your computer. If you disobey these rules,
we have to exclude you from the experiment and all payments. If you have any questions,
please raise your hand. An experimenter will come to your seat to answer your questions.
During the experiment, we are not talking about Euros but tokens. Your payment will
be calculated in tokens. At the end of the experiment your overall score will be converted
to Euro, whereas
1 Token = 10 Eurocent.
The experiment consists of two parts and a questionnaire. Part 1 will be explained below.
Once all participants have finished part 1, you will receive the instructions for part 2.
After part 2 a questionnaire will follow.
Instructions Part 1 (equal for SYMP and PERF )
In Part 1 of the experiment all participants are requested to solve an assignment, which
will be explained more precisely in the following:
On your screen a matrix, i.e. a rectangular arrangement of different symbols will appear
in a framed box. The matrix has 3 columns and 3 rows. The symbol in the lower
right corner is missing. There will be 8 symbols beneath the matrix, one of which fits
schematically in the lower right corner of the matrix. An example is given below.
In this example the correct solution is symbol number 5.
Your task is to choose the right symbol. After you made your choice, a new matrix
including 8 new symbols will appear. Again exactly one of the 8 symbols fits in the lower
right corner of the matrix.
You have to choose a symbol for each matrix. You cannot move on on to the next matrix
without making a choice. Moreover you will not be able to go back to the previous matrix
and change your choice after you have confirmed it.
You have 5 minutes (300 seconds) to solve as many matrixes as possible. Your remaining
time will be displayed in the upper right corner of your screen. On the left bottom of the
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screen, you will see how many matrices you have solved correctly and incorrectly so far,
and whether your last choice was correct or wrong. The difficulty of the matrices will
increase as time elapses.
Your payment for Part 1
You will receive 5 tokens for each matrix you solve correctly. For each matrix you solve
wrongly, 5 tokens will be deducted from your earnings. Thus, your overall score is:
5 x (number of correctly solved matrices - number of incorrectly solved matrices)
In the following, we call the difference (number of correctly solved matrices - number of
incorrectly solved matrices) your performance. If your performance is negative, i.e. if
you solve more matrices incorrectly than correctly, you will receive 0 tokens for part 1.
Therefore, your payment for part 1 is:
5 x your performance if your performance > 0 or 0 if your performance < / = 0
The Course of Part 1
After every participant has read these instructions, we will tell you a password. After
having entered the password, two trial matrices will successively appear on your screen,
in order for you to get used to the type of matrices and to the selection of symbols. You
won’t receive a payment for solving the trial matrices. Afterwards, the 5 minutes will
start as described above. After the 5 minutes part 1 is completed and the instructions
for part 2 will be handed out.
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Instructions Part II27
At the beginning of part 2, role A and role B are assigned randomly to every participant.
There are 24 participants in the room. Role A is randomly assigned to 8 participants
(“A-persons”) and role B is randomly assigned to 16 participants (“B-persons”). You
will be informed about your role on your screen at the beginning of part 2.
Ranking
The 16 B-persons will be ranked according to their performance in part 1. There
will be 8 ranks in total. Each rank will be allocated to two B-persons. The two
B-persons having the highest and the second highest performance will be assigned rank
1, the two B-persons with the third and the fourth highest performance will be assigned
rank 2, ..., the two B-persons with the lowest and the second lowest performance will be
assigned rank 8.
Remember:
Performance= # of correctly solved matrices - # of incorrectly solved matrices
If several B-Persons have the same performance and cannot be assigned to the same rank,
the B-Person, who solved more matrices correctly, gets the higher rank. If this number
is also equal, ranks will be assigned by chance.
Thus, a B-Person will be assigned rank...
...1 if 0 or 1 of the other 15 B-persons performed better than him.
...2 if 2 or 3 of the other 15 B-persons performed better than him.
...3 if 4 or 5 of the other 15 B-persons performed better than him.
...4 if 6 or 7 of the other 15 B-persons performed better than him.
...5 if 8 or 9 of the other 15 B-persons performed better than him.
...6 if 10 or 11 of the other 15 B-persons performed better than him.
...7 if 12 or 13 of the other 15 B-persons performed better than him.
...8 if 14 or 15 of the other 15 B-persons performed better than him.
Self-assessment of the B-persons
Each of the 16 B-persons will estimate his rank between 1 and 8.
The B-persons will be informed about their actual rank at the end of the experiment.
Matching of B-pairs
The two B-persons who have achieved the same rank will be matched together to a
so-called B-pair. Since there are 8 ranks, there will be 8 B-pairs in total.
[[Task 2 of the B-persons
After the estimation of their rank, all B-persons will conduct the same task as in part
27Passages only occurring in SYMP are indicated by [...], passages only occurring in PERF are indi-
cated by [[...]].
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1 with different matrices, called task 2. The difficulty of the matrices will be similar as
in part 1. As in part 1, each B-person will solve the matrices by himself. However, the
payment of a B-person for task 2 will now depend on his performance in comparison to
the performance of the B-person, who he is matched with.
The payment scheme for task 2 is similar to a competition. The B-person, who will
achieve the higher performance in Task 2 within a pair, will win 50 points.
If both B-persons achieve the same performance in Task 2, the B-person, who solved
more matrices correctly, will win. If this number is also equal, chance will decide who of
the two B-persons will win the competition, thus getting 50 points. The other B-person
will receive 0 points for Task 2.]]
Assignment
Each A-person will be assigned one of the 8 B-pairs. This allocation will be random and
anonymous. No participant will get to know the identity of the participants assigned to
him during or after the experiment.
[Payment Part 2
Every A-person will receive 50 points. One of the B-persons within each B-pair will also
receive 50 points. The A-person who is assigned to this pair will decide who of the two
B-persons will receive the 50 points.]
[[A-persons’ bet
The A-persons are not taking part in Task 2. Instead, they will bet on one of the two
B-persons, who were assigned to them. If the B-person, who the A-person has bet on,
wins, the A-person will receive 50 points.]]
A-persons’ selection decisions
The A-person will decide, [who of the B-persons will get the 50 points] [[on whom of
the two B-persons he will bet on]], in dependence of the B-persons’ deviations of their
estimated ranks from their actual rank.
The A-person will decide for 12 possible combinations of deviations of the estimated ranks
of the B-persons from their actual rank, [who of the B-person will receive the 50 points]
[[on whom of the B-persons he will bet on]] (case 1-12). In each case, the two B-persons
are under- or overestimating themselves differently. For example, the cases 1, 2 and 12
are as follows:
Case 1:
- One person is overestimating himself by 1 rank
- One person is underestimating himself by 1 rank
32
Case 2:
- One person is overestimating himself by 2 ranks
- One person is underestimating himself by 2 ranks
...
Case 12:
- One person is under-/overestimating himself by 0 ranks
- One person is underestimating himself by 2 ranks
For each of the listed cases, the A-person will choose the person [who he wants to receive
the 50 points] [[he wants to bet on]], in case this case will occur. Only one case can
apply to the B-pair that is assigned to the A-person. If a case applies to the B-pair,
the selection decision for this case will become relevant. [The B-person chosen by the
A-person receives 50 points.] [[If the selected B-person wins the competition in Task 2,
the A-person will receive 50 points.]]
Note: It is not the task of the A-person to decide which self-assessments of the B-persons
are most likely to occur. If the selection decision, e.g. for case 1, becomes relevant, one of
the two B-persons overestimated himself by 1 rank and the other person underestimated
himself by 1 rank. The A-person [decides who of the two persons will receive 50 points]
[[chooses the person who he will bet on in this case]].
Example: One of the two B-persons overestimated himself by 2 ranks and the other one
underestimated himself by 2 ranks. Thus, the decision taken by the A-person in case 2
is relevant. [The B-person chosen by the A-person in case 2 gets the 50 points.] [[If the
A-person selects the person, who overestimated himself by 2 ranks, and this person wins
the competition in Task 2, the A-person will receive 50 points. If the A-person selects the
person, who underestimated itself by 2 ranks, and the selected person wins, the A person
will also receive 50 points. Otherwise the A-person does not get any points.]]
Since the A-persons will not learn which case is relevant until having taken the selection
decisions, they should take the decision for every case, as if this case was relevant for
the assigned pair. In the event that none of the cases 1-12 will apply to the B-pair, the
A-person will also take a more general selection decision, called case 13.
CASE 13: The selection decision in this case will become relevant if none of the cases
1-12 applies to the B-pair. In this case the A-person decides, whether [the person who
stated the higher (better) rank, or the person who stated the lower (worse) rank out of
the two B-persons will get the 50 points] [[ he wants to bet on the person, who stated
the higher (better) rank, or on the person, who stated the lower (worse) rank.]]. Note: A
higher (better) rank means that the B-person has stated a smaller number. The accuracy
of the stated ranks is not considered in case 13.
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In Case 13 the A-person has the following choice:
[[To choose]] [[To bet on]]
- the person who estimated the higher (better) rank
- the person who estimated the lower (worse) rank
Example: If one of the two B-persons overestimated himself by 3 ranks and the other
person underestimated himself by 3 ranks, a case that doesn’t correspond to any of the
cases 1-12, then the decision of the A-person in case 13 will become relevant. Since both
B-persons are assigned the same rank, the person who overestimated his rank by 3 ranks
is the person who stated the higher rank. The person who underestimated his rank by 3
ranks is the person who estimated the lower rank.
Equal self-assessment of the B-persons:
If both B-persons estimate the same rank, none of the cases 1-13 is relevant, and chance
will decide [who of the two B-persons will receive the 50 points] [[on who of the two
B-persons the A-person will bet on]].
A-persons’ information
After the selection decisions, but before the B-persons will begin task 2, the A-person
will learn about how many ranks the two B-persons over- or underestimated themselves.
Thus, they learn which case is relevant, or which B-person has been selected randomly
respectively. The A-person will neither learn the actual nor the estimated ranks of the
B-persons.
Summary and course of action of part 2
Based on the performance in part 1, the 16 B-persons will be ranked, whereas always two
B-persons will receive the same rank.
The two B-persons being assigned the same rank will be matched to a B-pair. Each
B-pair will be randomly assigned to an A-person.
Each B-person will estimate his rank between 1 and 8. The B-persons will be informed
about their actual rank at the end of the experiment.
At the same time each A-person will decide for 13 different combinations of deviations
of the B-persons’ estimated ranks from their actual rank, [which agent will receive 50
points] [[on whom he wants to bet]].
After the decisions the A-persons will learn the B-persons’ actual deviations and which
of the cases 1-13 has occurred. If both B-persons estimated the same rank, chance will
decide [who of the two agents will get the 50 points ] [[on whom the A-Person will bet]].
[The B-person chosen in this case receives 50 points as does the A-person.]
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[[Subsequently, all B-persons conduct task 2. The B-person achieving the higher perfor-
mance will receive 50 points. If the A-person chose this B-person in the relevant case,
the A-person will also receive 50 points.
After Task 2 the B-persons will learn their actual rank.]]
During the experiment, all participants will get the chance to earn additional points by
answering additional questions.
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